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RECENT DECISIONS
-predominant test in determining the applicable period of limitations and the
date of accrual of the cause of action, thus satisfying the demands of con-
sistency and also preventing a party from finding himself in the position of
having his action barred before he knows of the breach. However in New
York the liability of the wroug, for breach of warranty, arises on the date
of sale, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila Lynn, Inc., supra, and "except in
cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides otherwise, the statutory
period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for the wrong
has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of
the wrong or injury." Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N. Y.
287, 200 N. E. 824, 104 A. L. R. 450 (1936).
Finally, a third theory might be that, since the action has a dual aspect,
suit must be brought within six years from the date of sale or three years from
the date of injury whichever is the shorter of the two periods.
John G. Wick
LABOR LAW - DISCRIMINATION BY UNION SEEKING UNION
SHOP ON BASIS OF SEX HELD "UNREASONABLE"
Defendant unions picketed plaintiff's tavern to induce acceptance of a
union shop. Plaintiff was willing to comply, and her employees were willing to
join the unions. But three of plaintiff's bartenders were women and the bar-
tenders' union strict policy was to admit only male bartenders to member-
ship. Thus, compliance with the union's demand would require plaintiff to
discharge, or at least take from behind the bar, the three barmaids. Held: in-
junction restraining picketing of plaintiff's establishment granted, "unless the
defendant unions agree, in the alternative, either to admit the barmaids pres-
ently employed by the plaintiff . . ., or to modify their demand for a union
shop, so as to exempt the barmaids now employed by the plaintiff from the
requirement that all the plaintiff's employees be or become members of de--
fendant unions." Wilsonv. Hacker, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
It has become well established during the past two decades that at least
in respect to employees at the time the union contract is entered into, a union
cannot demand a closed shop while at the same time maintaining an arbitrarily
closed union. Clarkv. Curtis, 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 3 (1947). The
principle has been justified in various ways, the first of these theories being
that of a principal-agent relationship. A union is required to act as exclusive
bargaining agent for all the employees in a given bargaining unit [see N. Y.
Labor Law § 705(1) and N. L. R. A. § 9a] and therefore must represent each
employee fairly and impartially. Any arbitrary conduct or discrimination on
the part of the union which would deprive any of the employees who are will-
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ing to join the union of any rights accorded to the members of the union would
be unlawful conduct agairist which, in an appropriate case, an injunction might
issue. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
That nebulous factor known as public policy has also been important in
frustrating a closed union's attempt at enforcing a closed shop agreement in a
situation such as that presented in the principal case. This was especially true
in cases in which a union had, through closed shop agreements with most of
the employers in a particular industry in a given area, gained what the courts
considered a monopoly over the labor market. By reason of this monopoly a
union controlled the job rights in the area and as was pointed out in Wilson v.
Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, at 350, 197 A. 720,
at 722 (1938) ". . . the holders of monopoly must not exercise their power in
an arbitrary unreasonable manner so as to bring injury to others." Many of the
earlier cases laid great weight on the fact that the union possessed such a
monopoly that by refusing an otherwise qualified individual admittance into
the union, they were in fact depriving that person of the right to work. Carroll
v. Local 269, I. B. E. W., 133 N. J. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 223 (1943); James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944). However in many
later cases relief has been granted where there was no indication of a mo-
nopoly by the union. In two recent California decisions it was specifically
held that failure to allege a monopoly was not fatal to the cause of action in
the "closed shop-closed union" situation because relief is based on the theory
that such collective labor activity does not have a proper purpose and consti-
tutes an unlawful interference with an employee's right to work. Williams v.
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946); Thompson
v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal. 2d 721, 165 P. 2d 901 (1946).
The language in many of the cases, including the principal case of Wilson
v. Hacker, seems to indicate that the prohibition against the co-existence of a
closed shop and a closed union may not be absolute and there may be an area
where the two would be allowed to exist concurrently. In Wilson v. Hacker,
the union argued, and the court agreed, that the advancement of the union's
economic interest is a good justification for union activity, even though that
activity may cause injury to another. Barile v. Fisher, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N. Y.
S. 2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949). "However," said the court, 101 N.Y. S. 2d at 470,
"the means used to advance the economic interests of the union must be legiti-
mate ones," ones which the law will recognize, citing Advance Music Corp. v.
American Tobacco Co., 296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. 2d 401 (1946). The union's
attempt to better the economic position of its male members by means of dis-
criminating against women was not one which could be recognized as legiti-
mate. The union further argued that the presence of barmaids constituted a
risk to the liquor industry, but they failed to convince the court that this risk
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existed. But the court at least seemed to indicate that had the union shown
reasonable grounds for excluding the barmaids, an injunction would not have
been granted.
Despite the fact that the courts do, on occasions, speak of "reasonable
grounds for exclusion," it appears that there are no cases holding that such
grounds did exist. In the only case where a closed union and closed shop situa-
tion withstood a challenge by an employee who was deprived of a job as a
result thereof, the employee was one who came to work after the agreement
had been entered into. Walter v. MeCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N. E. 2d 677
(1941); see also Courant v. Int. Photographers Local 659, 176 F. 2d 1000
(1949). This would seem to indicate that the closed union-closed shop cases
protect a worker only from being deprived of his present employment. But see
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 CoL. L. REv. 33, 73 (1947).
Because of the lack of cases and authorities, it is impossible to spell out
what are "reasonable grounds for exclusion." However, an examination of
grounds that have been held unreasonable may be helpful. Among the fore-
most of these grounds is that of race or color. Many cases have held that a
union cannot demand a man's discharge because he is not a member of the
union and simultaneously deny him admission because of the pigmentation
of his skin. Wills v. Local 106, Hotel Employees Alliance, 26 Ohio Nisi Prius,
N. S. 435 (1927); James v. Marinship Corp., supra; Williams v. Brotherhood
of Boilermakers, supra. In New York unions are expressly prohibited by
statute from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.
Civil Rights Law, § 43.
It has been held that a union had no reasonable grounds for excluding
workers and thus depriving them of the right to work because there were union
men unemployed, Ryan v. Simons, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1950), reversed
on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 1000, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 18 (1950) - (see
note on this case, supra at); Schwab v. Moving Picture Operators Local
159, 165 Or. 602, 109 P. 2d 600 (1941) ; because the worker sought to be ex-
cluded had been active in another union, Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa.
Super. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939) ; see also Wallace Corp.v. N. L. R. B., 323 U. S.
248 (1944); or because the person seeking admission was actually an inde-
pendent peddler working for himself. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155
P. 2d 343 (19M). In the Bautista case the court could have found that the
union had reasonable grounds for excluding those who sought admission, and
three of the seven judges of the California' Supreme Court so found. The
situation there involved independent milk peddlers who purchased their dairy
products from the larger dairies which were 95% unionized. The union de-
manded that these peddlers employ union drivers. The peddlers refused but
offered to join the union themselves and they were turned down. The union
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thereupon wrote to the dairies requesting them to enforce the agreement be-
tween the dairies and the union to the effect that the dairies would not sell to
any independent peddlers who did not observe the same conditions of employ-
ment as those maintained in the organized plants. This action by the union
was held to constitute the seeking of an unlawful end by the use of unlawful
means. But as was pointed out by the dissent, the peddler-distributors "were
engaged in a type of activity which justifiably may be considered by labor as a
whole as inimical to its own economic interests ... and we cannot justifiably
pronounce that unions must either admit to membership such opponents or
else refrain from taking economic measures against them." Bautista v. Jones,
supra at 772, 155 P. 2d at 357.
The situation above relates one instance in which it may be that a union
has reasonable grounds for excluding an individual even if it does deprive him
of his job in a particular situation. It may also be reasonable for a union to
refuse to admit Communists and thus keep them from working on the grounds
that in times such as these they would be unsafe to work with, and also on the
ground that they would weaken the union internally and in the public eye. As
Wilson v. Hacker points up, the primary question is whether a union has
reasonable grounds for keeping a man off the job; the matter of exclusion from
the union is secondary. And the case clearly states that a union can have
reasonable grounds for getting a man discharged. However, since the court
here failed to find such grounds, and since all the prior cases reach the same
result, the law remains that: "A union may restrict its membership at pleasure;
it may under certain conditions lawfully contract with an employer that all
work shall be given to its members. But it cannot do both. " Wilson v. News-
paper and Mail Deliverers' Union, supra at 351, 199 A. at 722.
David Buch
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- NOTICE OF CLAIM -
INFANTS
A conflict in lower court decisions regarding the applicability of § 50-e of
New York General Municipal Law (N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 694) to infants has
finally been resolved by the Court of Appeals in Martin v. School Board of
Union Free District, 301 N. Y. 233, 93 N. E. 2d 655 (1950).
Section 50-e makes it necessary to file a notice of claim, as a condition
precedent to the commencement of an action against a municipal corporation,
within 90 days after the cause of action accrues (effective Sept. 1, 1950 N. Y.
Laws 1950, c. 481; prior to this date, the time allowed was 60 days). Subdi-
vision 5 of that section provides an exception for infants and other incapaci-
tated persons by allowing them up to one year after the cause of action accrues,
instead of only 90 days, to apply for leave to serve the notice of claim.
